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Abstract
This thesis examines the relationship between dollarization and banking stability in
Ecuador. Through an econometric analysis I find that the main variables that affect banking
stability in Ecuador are GDP, liquidity, financial efficiency, the proportion of productive

assets, the percentage of past-due loans, the ratio between total assets and total liabilities,
and the degree of concentration of the banking sector. All these variables have improved
in the past decade thus strengthening banking stability. Furthermore, the four main effects
of dollarization on a small, open, and developing economy include: i) the statistically
significant decrease in inflation, ii) the removal of the figure of the lender of last resort,
iii) the removal of currency risk, and iv) the increased credibility of regulatory
institutions. These positive effects are proven to have a direct connection to independent
variables, and thus on financial stability.
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Introduction

By the end of the 1990s, the world had reached an unprecedented level of
financial integration. World stock exchanges were interconnected to the point that, with
one click, a broker in England could buy a share of an American company listed in the
New York Stock Exchange. But the financial integration was not only prevalent among
industrialized countries. Investing in emerging markets became popular in order to
maximize gains and minimize risk through portfolio diversification. It all seemed to be
going well with the birth of powerful emerging actors such as Thailand and Brazil, but
most importantly, China.
It was then that the world realized that financial systems integration also meant an
increased risk of contagion. This was clearly demonstrated by the fact that the effects of
the Thai baht crisis were not limited to Thailand. Upon the collapse of the Thai economy
in 1997, investors from all over the world fled both Asian markets and all emerging
markets, intensifying the downfall of affected economies (Krugman, 2009). Facing high
risk, investors restricted loans to emerging economies. In 1997, the Asian financial crisis
became endemic and economies were highly set back in their growth.
The contagion of the Thai baht crisis led to severe financial and banking crises in
Latin America (Krugman, 2009). It led, for example, to the collapse of the Brazilian,
Argentinean, Mexican, and Ecuadorean economies. With the collapse, these countries
were left in a state of economic distress. This is why countries in emerging markets
started thinking of new policies and interventions that fitted their particular needs.
In Ecuador in particular, the banking sector had been deteriorating for the past
twenty years (Jácome, 2003). The contagion effect pushed the banking sector into a full-
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fledged crisis. Before the year 2000, banks were overexposed and undercapitalized and
could not meet their commitments. Inflation ran rampant and the government tried to
alleviate the problem by printing even more money causing the sucre to depreciate. This
development further undermined banks, as most of the loans made in the country were
denominated in dollars. Several banks went under, including the largest one, Filanbanco.
The government was forced to freeze the banks’ assets in order to prevent a run on the
banks and a widespread contagion effect (Jácome, 2003). These conditions brought about
the collapse of the sucre, which then forced Ecuador’s President, Jamil Mahuad, to adopt
the dollar as legal tender.
The purpose of this paper is twofold. The first goal is to explore how the stability
of the Ecuadorean banking system has changed in the past decade, and to explain the
causes of the change. Its second goal is to understand the effect of dollarization on the
stability of the system. To answer these questions, I develop a model of banking stability
that I estimate for the years 2000 to 2011. The econometric analysis shows that the
banking system has in fact become more stable in the past decade and, coupled with a
theoretical analysis, it shows that dollarization is the underlying reason for the improved
financial stability in Ecuador.
My research contributes to the literature by submitting a case-study that focuses
on the stability of the banking system of Ecuador. It is exactly the type of analysis that
economists suggest in order to properly understand policy implications of drastic
measures, such as dollarization, to minimize the negative unexpected consequences of
said interventions. Furthermore, it is an important first step to understand how
dollarization affects the banking sector in particular.
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Chapter one is a brief overview of the literature on the main effects of
dollarization and determinants of financial stability. While there is abundant literature on
both topics, their relationship has been less analyzed. Most of the literature on
dollarization was written at the beginning of the 21st century and there are not sufficient
case studies of small, dollarized economies such as Ecuador.
Chapter two summarizes Ecuador’s economic history from its independence from
Spain until the financial crisis of the late 1990s. It focuses on three economic periods,
each defined by the main export commodity of the time: the cocoa bean from early
republican times until the 1920s, followed by bananas (of which Ecuador is still the
world’s largest exporter) until the late 1960s, and oil since the 1970s when it was first
produced. In addition, I analyze the “lost decade” of the 1980s, and the turmoil of the
1990s that led to the dollarization process in early 2000.
Chapter three presents the model that helps me develop my work. The model was
proposed in a thesis written by Luisa Ericka Pérez Hernández (2009). Her model attempts
to answer the question on whether more stability or more fragility is brought about by an
increased concentration of the banking system in the Dominican Republic. Using this
model as a starting point, I redefine a few relationships, definitions, and scope of the
estimations, and I estimate the overall stability of the entire banking system in Ecuador.
In contrast to Pérez Hernández’s model, I include aggregate data from all banks rather
than focusing on selected banks. In addition, the definitions of certain variables were
amended trying as best as possible not to alter their meaning. Also, in order to simplify
the model, this study is a time-series analysis rather than a cross-sectional analysis of all
banks operating in Ecuador’s financial system in the time period between 2000 and 2011.
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Chapter four presents the results and estimations of the model. It is important to
note that the biggest hurdle in the construction of the model was the large serial
autocorrelation of the dependent variables. To address this shortcoming, I used the
Cochrane-Orcutt method of estimation to run the regressions. With this method, it is clear
that the results are very significant and relevant for the Ecuadorean financial system.
In chapter five, I engage in a theoretical analysis of how dollarization affects both
the system wide financial stability of Ecuador and the stability of the Ecuadorean market
for credits. This establishes a theoretical connection between the dollarization process
and the stability of the financial system. I had to do this because I could not find
information of the period before dollarization in Ecuador. This meant that I was not able
to conduct an empirical analysis on how dollarization has affected the financial system. I
conclude the chapter with a brief discussion on what other variables, such as the oil price,
may have affected the banking system in this particular period of time.
I close my analysis with a short summary of findings, explain why they are
relevant, and forward suggestions on how my analysis could be improved. I also discuss
recommendations for Ecuador and other countries that might consider dollarization in the
future.
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Chapter 1- Review of the Literature

The topic of dollarization was popular at the end of the 1990s and early 2000s
when several economists advocated that emerging countries should adopt a foreign
currency in order to stabilize their economies. The main argument in favor of
dollarization is the immediate price stability and trust in the economy that the adoption of
the US dollar as legal tender will bring, particularly if the value of the domestic currency
is in jeopardy.
In the article “Strict Dollarization and Economic Performance” Sebastian
Edwards and I. Igal Magendzo note, “the probability of being a dollarized country
depends on regional, geographical, political and structural variables” (Edwards &
Magendzo, 2003). Kenneth P. Jameson in his article “Dollarization: Wave of the Future
or Flight to the Past” further argues that dollarization, without being imposed by external
actors, is likely to occur under three circumstances. First, dollars to the domestic
economy must be available in large quantities. Second, domestic instability must affect
the functioning of the financial system and the confidence of domestic actors. Third,
there has to be an important dollarized sector of the economy (Jameson, 2001).
In their article “Dollarization, Bailouts, and the Stability of the Banking System,”
Douglas Gale and Xavier Vives also suggest that, in order for dollarization to be
beneficial for countries, it has to meet four main characteristics. First, the costs of
liquidating projects for banks have to be relatively small. Second, the monitoring effort of
bankers is important in improving the returns of the banks. Third, the costs of
establishing a reputation for the Central Bank must be deemed high. And fourth, moral
hazard cannot be too extreme in order for dollarization to be effective (Gale &Vives,
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2002). Jameson further argues that dollarization is nearly irreversible and that four
additional criteria need to be met for it to be beneficial. These criteria are: economies
should be tightly integrated and should experience similar shocks; the adopting country is
small, open, and its prices are largely set in dollars; the adopting market has flexible labor
markets that can adjust to shocks; and finally the adopting country’s Central Bank has
low credibility in undertaking stable policy. The author later analyzes the case study of
Ecuador and claims that in this case dollarization was the only alternative (Jameson,
2001).
Douglas Gale and Xavier Vives also list a set of benefits and costs associated with
dollarization. They claim that an economy benefits from dollarization because it “reduces
the transaction costs of trade, and if the country adopts a stable currency it commits to a
stable monetary policy.” The authors point out that dollarization “has the potential cost of
abandoning monetary policy and the exchange rate as policy instruments and
compromising the capacity to bail out the domestic banking system.” They claim this is
dangerous because the banking crises can be very damaging as a bailout often costs up to
20 percent of a country’s GDP (Gale & Vives, 2002).
Sebastian Edwards disputes the idea proposed by many economists that
dollarization is the best scenario for developing nations in his article “Dollarization and
Economic Performance.” Like Gale and Vives, Edwards agrees that a more careful
analysis is needed in order to decide whether a dollarization process is beneficial or
detrimental for an economy. Edwards concludes that the dollarization by itself does not
reduce risk; to be effective it has to be accompanied by other policies and/or events that
increase the stability of the system. He also claims that because the exchange rate is
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fixed, countries cannot adapt to external shocks, and that the Central Bank loses the
ability to print money. This signifies the loss of seignorage - the profit Central Banks gain
when printing money (Edwards, 2001).
Sofia Castillo (2006) disagrees with the abovementioned statements of Edwards
and Magendzo. She claims that increased dollarization (financial) is positively associated
with economic growth. She also states that the process has a stronger impact on inflation
than on any other variables. Furthermore, Castillo argues that dollarizing the economy
helps attract foreign direct investment, lowers interest rates, and makes trade easier,
especially for smaller countries in Latin America that trade predominantly with the
United States (Castillo, 2006).
Castillo also presents the view that dollarizing the economies is the only way to
achieve economic stability in Latin America. According to her “multivariate econometric
analysis,” dollarization has brought greater economic stability and economic progress to
Latin America. She ends her analysis by listing the negative effects: the loss of monetary
policy and the decline of the national identity represented by the national currency
(Castillo, 2006).
Roberto Chang and Andrés Velasco claim in their article “Dollarization:
Analytical Issues” that the costs of dollarization are due both to the fixity of exchange
rates and the loss of seignorage. The benefits are the amelioration of time-inconsistency
problems and the increasing of credibility of regulatory institutions; meaning that trust
and credibility are built on the Central Bank and other regulatory institutions. The
implication, then, is that the loss of seignorage can only be “unambiguously interpreted
as real losses to the economy if policy credibility problems are assumed away.” They
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argue that currencies are national symbols that would be costly to get rid of due to the
sense of pride that a country’s citizens invest in them (Chang &Velasco, 2001).
Edwards and Magendzo summarize the debate and note that those in favor of
dollarization claim that it will result in lower inflation, lower interest rates, higher
investment, and faster growth. They note that those opposed to dollarization assert that it
will result in difficulties accommodating external shocks including terms of trade and
world interest rate disturbances. Finally, Edwards and Magendzo conclude that other
economists simply state that the exchange rate does not affect growth but rather that
growth is determined by other variables (Edwards & Magendzo, 2003).
Perhaps one of the most disputed topics within the debate of dollarization is the
effect of the loss of a Lender of Last Resort (LOLR). Gale and Vives discuss how bank
bailouts might not always be beneficial and they provide the following four main reasons:
1. The threat of bankruptcy and loss of private benefits can motivate managers to exert
effort and improve the performance of the firm.
2. The possibility of a bailout reduces this incentive effect and indirectly encourages
managerial shirking and risk taking.
3. In emerging markets, moral hazard problems are widespread, and the economy relies
in an important way on the monitoring effort of bankers who provide finance to
entrepreneurial projects.
4. A time-consistent policy by the Central Bank may lead to excessive bailouts.
Anticipating this lack of financial discipline, bankers will not make sufficient effort to
screen and monitor projects. The result will be excessive financing of inferior projects,
inadequate monitoring, and poor project performance.
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Thus, dollarization represents a commitment by the Central Bank to a limited use
of the Lender of Last Resort (LOLR) and of Central Bank independence. Furthermore,
the perceptions of a market-default diminished when dollarization was implemented
possibly indicating that “banks were market-disciplined and responded to increases in
risk perception by being more prudent” (Gale & Vives, 2002).
One of the main questions Barry Eichengreen poses in his paper “What Problems
can Dollarization solve?” is whether dollarization is more likely to speed up or slow
down economic and financial reform. He states that there are two versions to the
argument. The first one says that dollarization will compel bank owner-managers to
acknowledge that they are no longer protected by the financial safety net. The other
argument is that dollarization enhances financial stability by promoting the development
of domestic financial markets. This enhancement is mainly achieved through the
disappearance of currency risk associated with smaller, more volatile currencies
(Eichengreen, 2001).
In addition to the theory mentioned above, economists have conducted empirical
analyses and shown differing results. Gale and Vives end their analysis with a set of
empirical results for countries that have adopted the dollar (or other important currencies)
as their legal tender. Regarding Ecuador in particular, they claim that dollarization could
be advantageous, as it fits the characteristics mentioned above. They do note, however,
that their article should only be used as a starting point for policy implementation and
that a more thorough analysis of individual case studies is needed to make a final
decision (Gale &Vives, 2002).
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Edwards also conducts an empirical analysis of whether dollarization has helped
countries that have adopted it. He states that “when compared to other countries, the
dollarized nations have had a significantly lower inflation” as well as a “significantly
lower growth rate of GDP per capita.” He states that these countries have had a similar
fiscal record, have not been spared from major current account reversals, and that the
costs of external shocks are higher in terms of investment and growth (Edwards, 2001).
A critical aspect to consider is Edwards’s and Magendzo’s finding that “GDP per
capita growth has not been statistically different in dollarized and in non-dollarized ones
but volatility has been significantly higher in dollarized than in non-dollarized
economies.” They also reiterate the idea presented in the other articles that inflation is
significantly lower in dollarized countries (Edwards & Magendzo, 2003).
In terms of financial stability, Luisa Erika Pérez Hernández (2009) presents an
analysis of two models that are intended to measure the stability of the banking system of
the Dominican Republic. She specifies two dependent variables; one refers to the system
wide stability, and the other to credit risk. Both models have the same seven independent
variables. It is important to note, however, that the main purpose of her analysis is to
show the relationship between concentration and stability of the banking system as well
as the shape of this relationship (Pérez Hernández, 2009).
To summarize, economists agree that dollarization brings about lower rates of
inflation and an increase in stability of the country. They also agree that the credibility of
regulatory institutions is enhanced and that the currency risk disappears along with the
currency itself. They also agree that with the loss of monetary policy and the national
currency countries lose a measure of sovereignty that might affect the country both
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economically and politically. The matter is not so clear in terms of macroeconomic
growth. Economists disagree on whether more growth is achieved or if there is no
difference. They also disagree on how growth volatility is affected. Surprisingly, there is
no focus on specific sectors of the economies that might help answer some of these
questions.
My present paper adds to the literature an important case-specific econometric
analysis that explains the banking stability of Ecuador. I link the stability of the banking
system to dollarization both directly and indirectly, in order to understand how
dollarization has affected the evolution of banking. My hypothesis is that gains in greater
strength and efficiency of the banking sector- in any country that dollarizes- may more
than outweigh the costs of seignorage loss and limited opportunity for LOLR by the
Central Bank.
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Chapter 2: Economic History of Ecuador

The economic history of Ecuador between the 19th and the late 20th centuries is
not a happy one. It is marked by short periods of bonanza based on the exports of a single
commodity, followed by a large and detrimental crisis with the deterioration of the terms
of trade and loss of market share. This cycle between economic prosperity and crisis has
led to widespread political instability and political tensions between the two most
powerful economic regions within the country, coupled with growth volatility.
There are three major economic periods in the history of Ecuador: the cocoa
period, when Ecuador clearly distinguished itself as the main producer and exporter of
the good for international markets; the export of bananas and Import Substitution
Industrialization (ISI) policies; and the extraction and sale of crude oil since the early
1970s . Each period is followed by long crises defined by the fall in price of the product,
the increase in competition, and vulnerability to the competition and volatility of
international markets. In the following sections, I analyze each of these periods in
addition to the effects said period had on the politics and distribution of power within the
country. Next, I address the lost decade and the crisis of the late 1990s, since these were
of particular significance for the dollarization process and the evolution of the banking
system in the country.
The Cocoa Period: Beginning of the Natural Resource Curse in Ecuador

After achieving political independence, Ecuador’s economy was based primarily
on agriculture. Most of the economic activities performed in the country were grounded
in the “hacienda” system of exploitation, where the land was distributed in large
15

latifundia among the elites. Paul Henderson quotes Ivar Erneholm, author of the book
Cocoa production of South America when he notes that, “seldom has a single product for
such a long time dominated the economic life of a country as did cocoa in Ecuador”
(Henderson, 1997). Production of cocoa in the coast started in the 1830s, and
immediately became the major source of income for the country. Because of its regional
production, it set the economic regional elites of the coast against the political and
economic elites of the highlands. During the late 19th century and beginning of the 20th
century, the market for the good was flooded with a large increase in competition from
other regions of the world. This international development plunged Ecuador into an
economic crisis and recession that lasted until the onset of the Great Depression in the
United States.
The Cocoa Bonanza
During the mid 19th century, Ecuador was able to establish itself as the major
producer of cocoa in the world, which allowed for a period of economic growth and
prosperity. Indeed, international observers were optimistic about Ecuador's future
performance due to its large market share of this product (Henderson, 1997).
The cocoa trade expansion ensued during the decades between 1870 and 1910. In
England, demand and consumption of cocoa increased eightfold despite the rise in prices,
as the then new beverage, hot chocolate, became very popular (Henderson, pg. 171).
Exports of cocoa rose from 8,380 kilos in 1860 to 18,120 kilos in 1880 and 36,305 kilos
in 1910. In this period, the production expansion was attributed not only to land
redistribution and more effective agricultural practices, but also to the claiming of
previously unused territories in the Ecuadorean lowlands by large families. In fact,
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around 70 percent of the cocoa producing land in the coast belonged to between 10 and
20 families (Henderson, pg. 174).
Labor force exploitation was also predominant during this period. Most of the
labor employed both in the production of cocoa beans in the coast and other agricultural
products in the north, was based on a semi-servile system and semi-waged labor force. In
exchange for small parcels of land, workers were required to work for the large estate
holders. They were not paid salaries and had no benefits. Furthermore, workers were tied
to the lands they worked on by a system referred to in Ecuador as “concertaje.” With this
system, inherited from colonial times, the landowner elites granted loans to their serfs
that were very difficult (if not impossible) to repay. Debt repayment forced workers and
their families to be tied down to the estate, because if the original debtor could not pay,
their children and family members inherited the land, along with their obligations. The
one big change that occurred during the cocoa economy was the introduction of seasonal
waged labor. During harvesting times, some workers were given wages in order to supply
all the labor required to gather the crops. This, however, was an insignificant percentage
of the labor force, as the labor environment remained mainly an adaptation to the feudal
system seen in the centuries before.

The Decline in the Cocoa Trade and the Collapse of the Economy

Up until the 1920s, cocoa exports represented a large amount of the Ecuadorean
GDP, and then the economy began to suffer. As all single-export commodity oriented
economies, Ecuador was hit by a crisis in its cocoa industry. Several factors contributed
to its decline: exogenous factors such as the increase in international competition, internal
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collapse of the political system, and irresponsible use of the revenues by the controlling
elites.
During the early 20th century, Ecuador’s cocoa trade took a turn for the worse.
With increased competition coming from African countries and Brazil, Ecuador saw a
large decrease in its market share for cocoa production. This development was later
accentuated by the fall of demand due to the Great Depression. Before 1910, exports of
cocoa from Ecuador accounted for well over 20 percent of world production. In 1914,
even though Ecuador saw a particularly high harvest, its market share accounted for only
15.3 percent of world production (Henderson, 1997). Large plagues hit the Ecuadorean
crops during the post WWI period. The diseases Witches' Broom and Monilia Pot Rod
largely decimated crops in Ecuador and created large losses for the exporting elites
(Henderson, 1997). World over-production of cocoa drove the price down which
accounted for large losses for the economy.
Use of cocoa revenue by the elite was a major factor in the failure of the exporting
cocoa boom because they failed to reinvest it in the local economy and squandered it
abroad instead. During the boom, several of the most prominent exporter families chose
to reside outside of Ecuador, predominantly in Paris. This practice was so prevalent that,
between 1900-1913, almost 20 percent of export income was transferred to family
members who lived abroad (Larrea and North, 1997). The economic elites did not invest
in Ecuador; rather, they preferred to buy imported non-essential goods. This large
increase in imports destroyed national enterprises, which led to a failure of the economy
to diversify and accentuated the dependence on cocoa for its survival.
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The fall in the cocoa economy left a large vacuum in Ecuador and the economy
did not recover until the 1940's when the increase in banana production replaced that of
the cocoa bean. During the time of the cocoa trade, the economy clearly did not diversify
and relied on a single crop that was easy to produce and transport with little backward
and forward linkages. Even though cocoa production lost all of its significance and the
bankruptcy of several of the largest producers led to the abandonment of large estates, the
economic core of this elite survived to recover its economic power. The old elite, along
with some new members, started the production of bananas after World War II (WWII).
Ecuador after World War II: The Banana Republic

Even today, Ecuador is known as a predominant example of a banana republic.
The country is still the largest exporter of bananas in the world and despite its diminished
importance, bananas still constitutes the largest agricultural export of Ecuador. In 1948,
after World War II, the economic elite of the coast reengaged in significant banana
production. Cooperation between multinational corporations and the Ecuadorean
government created a partnership for a new stage of economic growth. The economy
finally showed some signs of economic and structural reform, both in the export and
internal sectors of production. Unlike cocoa, banana production revolutionized how the
economy functioned because large revenues allowed the country to implement ISI. The
banana boom only lost its momentum with the emergence of the oil sector in the early
70s.

19

The Banana Boom

After two decades of economic stagnation, the Ecuadorean economy finally
showed some signs of recovery in the 1950’s due to the export of bananas. This
commodity was vastly different from cocoa and allowed diversification and
industrialization. Banana production replaced the old system of haciendas with a system
of plantations, and most of the production came from small to mid-sized plantations that
were primarily nationally owned.
The banana production industry differs from the cocoa industry because it is labor
intensive and works mostly with paid workers. Rafael Correa, an economist and current
constitutional President of Ecuador, claims that this was one of the main milestones
achieved by the banana bonanza (SOURCE?). Prior to it, the wage-labor in the country
was negligible. In the period after WWII, a massive migratory movement from the
Ecuadorean highlands, where the system of “concertaje” was in place, to the coastlands
took place. Here, the demand for labor was immense and owners used wages as an
incentive for workers. This migratory movement also reflected the high unemployment in
the aftermath of the fall of the cocoa trade and the opportunities that banana production
offered. The government, whose interests lay with the large producers of bananas, backed
the shift in employer-worker relations. It promoted large programs of development of
previously unoccupied and therefore unproductive territories. This meant that the banana
sector encouraged the appearance of a sizable rural middle class in parts of the export
zone (Correa, 2008).
The result of this shift was not only a more mobile labor class, but also large
degrees of urbanization. With the elimination of the hacienda system through a reform,
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the labor force that was once tied down to large estates could now move freely. This
meant that a large amount of previously unemployed or underemployed individuals
moved to large cities, mainly Quito and Guayaquil.
Another important shift in Ecuador’s economy during the banana period was that
banana production, as opposed to cocoa production, required large amounts of
investments in infrastructure, telecommunications, and commercialization. The
government owned stakes in the production of bananas and facilitated trade with other
countries. The boom, therefore, allowed Ecuador to engage in several industries that were
previously neglected. Larrea and North (1997) claim that tax revenue derived from the
substantially increased import capacity generated by the new export boom facilitated
modernization of public institutions as well as the expansion of public investment not
only in infrastructure but also in promotional activities (Larrea and North, 1997).
The government of Ecuador decided to follow the current economic trend in Latin
America and began to implement ISI. The economic surplus created by the banana trade
provided the economy with the first opportunity to engage in such policies. While the
extent to which the policies implemented can truly be defined as ISI is debated, it is clear
that the government incentivized local production in order to encourage industrialization.
International institutions such as the United Nations directly supported ISI. In fact, in
1954 Raúl Prebisch addressed the organism and presented his report entitled “The
Economic Development of Ecuador” in which he emphasized the importance and
urgency of implementation of ISI policies in the country (Correa, 2008). That same year
in May, the “Junta de Planificación” was created. This organism had the mandate to
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foment ISI. The ISI model of economic development, however, had its main impacts in
the following decade during the oil boom.
The Decline of the Banana Trade

Even though Ecuador is still the largest banana exporter in the world, the staple
has lost relative importance in the local market for several reasons. First, the discovery of
oil in the mid 1960s, and its production starting in 1972, led the commodity to become
second in importance to government and international investors. Also, important
technological advances in the 1960s had detrimental effects on the banana production
labor force. In fact, in one coastal province alone, the labor force decreased from 90,000
to 55,000 workers from 1965 to 1976 and to 36,500 workers in 1983. This led to higher
unemployment, urbanization, and growth of the informal sector as the large amount of
unemployed workers moved to large urban centers.
Wages decreased as unemployment was rampant. Economies of scale of new
technological processes meant that the banana plantations would only achieve this
efficiency with large plantations similar to those seen in the cocoa boom. In fact, there
was a large drive both from multinational corporations operating in Ecuador and the
government itself to centralize the production of bananas in a small number of firms in
order to increase productivity. Thus as the 1960s and 1970s unfolded, banana production
was centralized into four larger producers (one owned by the state and the other three by
foreign investors). This meant that previously large number of small to midsized firms
lost considerable market share and these firms were driven out of business, so banana
production ceased to play a central role before the 1970s.
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The Oil Boom: Ecuador's Future Redefined

During the mid-1960s, large oil fields were discovered beneath the Amazon rain
forest. This represented the single most important discovery in Ecuadorean economic
history and it shaped how Ecuador approached the world. It redefined Ecuador from an
agricultural exporter of bananas into an economy focused largely on crude oil extraction.
In fact, Ecuador became a member of the Organization of Oil Producing Countries
(OPEC). The economic model for Ecuador, however, remained one based on the export
of one primary commodity, though revenues from oil led Ecuador into a period of
unprecedented growth, industrialization, and development.
The Oil Boom

During the 1960s, when banana exports were significantly changing with the
increase of technology and formation of large estates, the oil discovery marked the
beginning of a new economic period. ISI policies that started during the banana boom
were further accentuated with the massive inflows of petrodollars to the economy. The
large oil sector expansion allowed for massive amounts of foreign direct investments
(FDI) as well as large loans to the government.
One of the most notable effects of the sudden oil extraction surge was the
substantial increase in living standards. “Ecuador grew 14 percent in 1972, 25 percent in
1973, and 8 percent on average between 1971 through 1981 which meant that GDP more
than duplicated in these ten years” (Correa, 2008). This unprecedented expansion led to
large increases in population, urbanization, and population wellbeing. GDP per capita
grew by 72 percent due to the oil boom during this period (Correa, 2008). Illiteracy fell
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from 23.7 percent of the population in 1974 to 14.8 percent in 1982 (North and Larrea,
1997). In terms of urbanization, Correa states “in 1965, 65 percent of the labor force was
rural whereas in 1982 this number dropped to 48 percent. This means that urban labor
force grew by 137 percent in 20 years” (Correa, 2008). All these indicators show that the
Ecuadorean society was revolutionized with the exports of oil.
ISI measures first implemented during the banana era were expanded. Correa
(2008) states that industrial exports grew 28 percent per year in the 1970s due to
economic reforms going from 29 to 490 million dollars. This large industrialization push
was managed not only through the promotion of national industries but also through a
large increase in the net amount of industrial imports. Imports increased from 181 to
1.318 billion dollars during this period. Thus, despite significant growth of industrial
exports, industrial imports increased almost tenfold causing a large non-oil current
account deficit accentuating the reliance on revenue gained from oil in order to maintain
a stable government balance (Henderson, 1997)
The Impacts of the Oil Boom

As mentioned above, the reliance on oil for growth meant that the amount of
imports dramatically increased. As the economy became increasingly reliant on
international markets for oil, it also needed the high crude oil prices brought about by the
oil shocks. The large amount of capital required for oil extraction led the government to
engage in heavy borrowing, which later led to the debt crisis of 1983. Also, the large
levels of urbanization promoted by the oil boom meant that there were not enough
workers in the agricultural areas of the country and too many unemployed workers
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settling in the city, which was detrimental for both urban and rural societies alike. Lastly,
Ecuador is a clear example of the Dutch disease in action. When the price of oil fell, the
fundamental weaknesses of the country’s economy were evident.
Policies intended to promote ISI were also unable to create their expected
economic growth due to the large amount of imports promoted by the large revenues of
oil exports. It is ironic that during a period that was supposedly dedicated to the
promotion of national production and industrial development, industrial imports
increased more than sevenfold (Correa, 2008). This caused a complete lack of vertical
integration between the different companies of the country. Production of one good was
still dependent on the exchange rate, as the raw materials needed to expand, or even
continue production, were imported and thus, the country’s industrial production varied
when the exchange rate varied. This is why economists that focus on Ecuador claim that
ISI was not viable.

The Lost Decade of Latin America: The Tragic Example of Ecuador

When Mexico defaulted on its loans in 1982, most Latin American countries
found themselves facing a precarious future. In Ecuador, the government’s capacity to
borrow from international capital markets diminished, the internal banking system was
highly indebted and about to collapse, and a number of external factors were affecting the
country’s exports. These developments led to large social and political unrest, as well as
an economic recession.
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The Ecuadorean Debt

A variety of factors affected the government’s capacity to borrow during the
1970s and the 1980s. First, there was a large increase in liquidity in international markets,
which led international banks and creditors to consider developing regions as potential
markets for their investments and loans. Interest rates charged to developing countries
were low, which lowered the cost of borrowing money. In theory, international banks
wanted to maximize their returns through investing in high yield development programs
in Latin America. They also had to find a market for their extra cash in order to offer the
returns they promised their clients. In Ecuador, this meant that loans owned by
international banks and financial institutions grew from 82 billion dollars to 440 billion
dollars.
The largest growth period in public debt in Ecuador started in 1976. Public debt
went from 229 million dollars in 1970 to 4.416 billion dollars in 1981. This change
translated into a very large increase in government spending. In fact, Correa calculates
that public spending grew threefold during this period (Correa, 2008). As a percentage of
GDP, this change translated into an increase from 12 to 16 percent of GDP, causing
private investments to drop to only 6 percent of GDP. Due to the large availability of
funds, most of the loans were contracted at flexible interest rates within the range of 4 to
6 percent, but were subject to revision. Thus, when the Mexican government defaulted on
their loans and banks lost confidence in emerging markets, loan interest rates contracted
by Ecuador went up to 20 percent. These loans were virtually impossible to pay. The
government used the price of oil as backup in order to contract more loans. During the
1970s, the nominal price of oil reached levels above the US $40 per barrel mark. After
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the oil booms and with the reentry of countries that had not been producing during the
last decade into the market, the price collapsed to below US $15 per barrel in 1983. With
the increase in the interest rates and the decrease of revenues of oil (which accounted for
at least 50 percent of GDP at the time) Ecuador found itself in a highly detrimental debt
trap (Correa, 2008).
Most of the Ecuadorean debt contracted from 1976 onwards was public, but the
private sector also assumed large debts. Since the year 1976, private debt went from 57
million dollars to 1.452 billion dollars in 1981. The government sponsored substantial
portions of this massive increase in debt in order to implement ISI. When the oil price
fell, the Ecuadorean government was no longer able to maintain the exchange rate that it
had previously stabilized after the rise in oil price. When this change ensued, the
exchange rate grew from 25 sucres to US$1 in 1979 to 42 sucres to US$1 in 1983, almost
doubling the amount national private debtors had to pay: debts had been contracted in
dollars but firms earned in sucres. The exchange rate entered a downward spiral and, by
the beginning of the 1990's, it stood at 800 sucres per US$1. This measurable drop drove
the government to take extreme and, perhaps, mistaken policies that would generate
further indebtedness of the public sector (Correa, 2008).
Ecuador through the “Lost Decade”

After the collapse generated by the debt crisis in 1983, Ecuador faced a period of
stagnation and economic hardship. During the 1980s Ecuador saw its economy shrink, its
political institutions weaken, and its banking sector in need of a bailout. To make matters
worse, the winter of 1983 disrupted exports of agricultural products from the coast
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(bananas, shrimp, etc.), and the earthquake in 1987 broke the pipeline through which
most of the oil extracted from the Amazon was transported to the coast to be shipped.
Both disasters caused huge losses in the country’s export capacity.
The debt crisis’ most critical effect was on the country’s standard of living.
Between 1981-1990, the GDP grew only 18 percent, so GDP per capita decreased by
5.67 percent annually back to mid-1970's levels (Correa 2008). The 1990 minimum wage
was only 41 percent of that in 1981. The industrial sector was also affected; during this
decade, industrial GDP decreased by 3.78 percent and industrial exports were lower in
1990 than in 1978 (Correa, 2008).
As the sucre depreciated and interest rates on loans contracted, the oil boom
continued, while the debt held by private institutions (mainly banks) reached such high
levels that it threatened the entire financial system. The government of Osvaldo Hurtado
adopted what it became known as the Sucretización of private external debt. The
government assumed responsibility for the dollar debts of the private sector, which
amounted to 1.476 billion dollars, and allowed the private institutions to pay the
government back in sucres. This move helped banks and financial companies, for it
prevented the continuing depreciation of the exchange rate to increase their private debt.
In addition, the government froze what interest rates companies had to pay at 16 percent
when the international interest rates surpassed 28 percent, and extended the period
companies had to pay their loans from three years to seven years. External debt increased
from around $4 billion in 1981 to upwards of $12 billion by 1990 due to refinancing and
capitalization of interests that were late. These measures helped limit the extent to which

28

investments fell, which ultimately proved to be only 14 percent of GDP, of which only 3
percent was public investment (Correa, 2008).
The Decade of 1990 and the Financial Crisis

After the disappointment and hardships of the lost decade, world-renowned
economists backed by the IMF and the World Bank suggested a set of policies of
economic liberalization, commonly referred to as the Washington Consensus. Once
again, Ecuador was fully committed to implement the reforms and liberalized its
economy extensively during the presidency of Sixto Durán Ballén (1992-1996). Durán
Ballén restructured the state-owned oil producing companies, granted more independence
to the Central Bank, forbade the funding of financial expenditure with its funds,
privatized the previously state-owned electric and telecommunications industries, and
deregulated the banking and financial systems (Jácome, 2004).
As in earlier periods, external factors affected extensively Ecuador’s
development. In 1995, Ecuador engaged in a military conflict with neighboring Peru. Due
to fear of inflationary and contractionary forces, the clash incited the fleeing from the
country of large amounts of capital. As if to make matters worse, El Niño, a
meteorological phenomenon, hit Ecuador in early 1990s, impacting greatly agricultural
productivity and the price of oil per barrel. The dual downturn engendered a large
reduction of export revenues. Lastly, the Asian financial crisis, which started in 1997,
brought about renewed investor uncertainty with regards to emerging markets. All of this
combined led to a period of instability in the financial sector (Jácome, 2004).
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The deregulation of the banking and financial system designed to address the
crisis created internal problems in the banks. It brought about the deterioration of balance
sheets, a lack of reserves and therefore liquidity, and the default of risky and bad credits.
In order to avoid the collapse of these private institutions, the Central Bank, in
conjunction with the government, created an agency for the guarantee of deposits (AGD).
With AGD in place, 100 percent of deposits were held in banks with no limit in the
nominal value, as it is customarily done in most countries (Correa, 2008). And yet, a
measure that was intended to stabilize the financial system led to renewed problems of
moral hazard and an increase in the approval of risky loans. With the government serving
as the ultimate guarantor responsible for all deposits made to the banking system,
whenever a debtor defaulted on its loans, the government would reimburse the bank for
its original investments in the form of client deposits (Jácome, 2004).
The only way the government could control the financial crisis was through the
use of monetary policy, which it used in a very irresponsible manner. It printed large
amounts of sucres in order to counter the lack of liquidity faced by banks. In 1998, the
monetary base increased by 41 percent and 136 percent during the following year. This
measure led to high levels of inflation, which in turn affected the exchange rate. The
average Consumer Price Index went from 23 percent in 1995 to 52 percent in 1999 and
96 percent in 2000 (Jácome, 2004). These increases, combined with negative
expectations of investors and the newly adopted floating exchange rate regime (as the
crawling peg could no longer be sustained), led to a large and rapid depreciation of the
exchange rate. It went from 800 sucres per dollar in 1990 to around 2,565 sucres per
dollar in 1995, and to a shocking 11,787 sucres per dollar in 1999. From then to the
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moment dollarization was put in place in January 2000, the price of the US dollar in
terms of sucres soared up to 25,000 sucres per dollar, at which the country's government
set a cap and adopted the dollar as the legal tender in Ecuador (Jácome, 2004).
Another factor that made the crisis even worse was the application of a tax of 1
percent to all capital movements, no matter their size. This action was combined with an
income tax elimination, which was said to put a burden on people that could not afford
payment. As a result, people withdrew as much cash as they could in order to use it and
not be taxed. The resulting run on the banks had large inflationary consequences on
everybody throughout Ecuador. This tax had to be revoked in 2000, when those in power
realized that it was unsustainable and detrimental for the economy Furthermore, to
prevent the collapse of banks, the government froze assets held as deposits by their
customers. This action brought renewed social unrest from people demanding access to
their funds. The government froze the assets when the exchange rate was 10,350 sucres
per dollar, and unfroze them after dollarization was introduced, when the exchange rate
had gone up to 25,000 sucres per dollar.
In short, the social costs of the crisis were immense. Population living under the
poverty line increased from 4.2 to 5.54 million people between 1995 and 1999 and the
GDP per capita fell by 7.6 percent in one year. Income inequality also increased- during
the early 1990's the lowest quintile got 4.4 percent of income and upper quintile got 52
percent, whereas in 2004 the percentages were 2.7 percent and 60 percent respectively.
Lastly, a massive surge of migration ensued. It is estimated (though the exact number is
difficult to know due to illegal migration) that between 300,000 and 1 million people
emigrated from Ecuador after the crisis.
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Though economists still disagree on the quality of the policies adopted by the
government during the crisis, the consensus among neoliberal economists seems to be
that the adoption of the US dollar as legal tender was the only solution. They saw it as the
better of two evils: default of the banks and collapse of the system or an attempt to
stabilize the economy without completely destroying the wealth held in banks. It was
unclear, however, if the Ecuadorean economy was ready for such a move and its effects
on the banking sector.
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Chapter 3- The Models

In this chapter, I present the banking stability models that will be estimated in
chapter 4. These models are based on those presented by Luisa Ericka Pérez Hérnandez
and are intended to measure the stability of the financial system as a whole, and the
stability of the market for credits in particular.
The aim of the model presented by Luisa Ericka Pérez Hernández (2009) is to
measure the level of competition in the Dominican financial system, and to determine: a)
if the level of competition of the financial system is positively correlated with its
stability; and b) if this correlation is linear or if it is “U” shaped (parabolic). The core
intent of her thesis is to use the Panzar and Rose H-statistic in order to determine the
relationship between competition and the stability of the financial system. Panzar and
Rose define their statistic as the sum of the elasticities of total income in respect to the
cost of inputs (Pérez Hernández, 2009) and they use it to calculate the shape of the
relationship between the competition and the stability of the financial system.
Understanding the shape of the relationship has important policy implications. If it is
determined that the shape of the relationship is parabolic, then there is an optimum level
of concentration and competition at which the financial system would operate best. If the
relationship is linear, one of the extremes will be the optimum depending on the sign of
the correlation.
Pérez Hernández uses cross-sectional data and analyzes all the banks in the
financial system of the Dominican Republic. Her model uses two different dependent
variables to measure stability: The Z index and the NPL variable. The Z index measures
the probability that the losses of each bank exceed the amount of productive assets. The
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NPL index is a measure of risk focused on the loan quality each bank holds in its
portfolio (defined as the irrecoverable losses plus loans considered risky over the total
amount of loans at period t). Each one of these dependent variables is explained in the
following section.
The independent variables for both models are the same: Ht that measures the
level of concentration of the banking system; GDPt measures the rate of growth of GDP
at time t; and CAit, LCit, CIRit, CVCit,EOit are all financial control indicators that measure
the ratio of productive assets, liquidity, market share in terms of loans, ratio of loans on
default, and financial efficiency, respectively. Thus, the two theoretical models the author
estimates are the following:
1. Z  βZ  φ H  φ H  θGDP  γ CIR   γ CA  γ LC 
γ CVC  γ EO  µ  ε And,
2. NPL  βNPL  φ H  φ H  θGDP  γ CIR   γ CA  γ LC 
γ CVC  γ EO  µ  ε
Banking Stability Models

For this analysis, I modified Pérez Hernández’s (2009) model in the following
way. First, I transformed the H-statistic and use it as an independent variable to measure
the level of concentration of the banking system in Ecuador. Second, I slightly changed
the mathematical definition of the variables due to data constraints. Furthermore, I have
simplified aspects of Hernández’s analysis because I do not take into consideration the
data of individual banks. Instead, I focus the analysis on the system-wide, aggregate data,
which leads to important transformations.
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Also, because I rely on time-series analysis, I cannot have too many dependent
variables in each regression. If I were to include too many variables, I run the risk of
trivializing the results and misconstruing the model. Thus, for each of the two models
(both for Zt and for NPLt) I have selected variables that best provide a theoretical
explanation of the variation. I use some of the variables in both models and some in only
one of them.
The information for the time period before July 2002 and the period afterwards
are presented by the “Superintendencia de Bancos” in two distinct ways. Before July
2002, the observations were much higher than the observations thereafter. There are two
plausible explanations for this occurrence. First, there was some sort of structural change
in either the economy or the financial system itself that brought about a change in the
economy. An example of this possible change would be a cleansing of portfolios from
loans on default aided by an increase in capital from the government in order to stabilize
the banking industry and bring security into each bank. A second explanation is that the
entity in charge of collecting the information for each bank (the “Superintendencia de
Bancos”) changed their methodologies to calculate data after July 2002.
Variable Specification

In this section I discuss the two main dependent variables. Though I intend to
explain what each dependent variable measures and how it does so, I also present a
graphical representation of the observations as well as the mathematical formula for each.
My analysis is accompanied by a short discussion on some of the problems encountered
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when attempting to define the variables
variables. After discussing the two dependent variables,
va
I
define the independent
dependent variables and what they measure.
Zt: Overall banking risk and the potential for financial collapse

The first dependent variable as explained by the original model is the probability
that the losses of each particular bank exceed the return on assets for each institution. For
this analysis, the variable attempts to measu
measure the probability of system-wid
wide banking
failure. It is defined as the total nominal value of productive assets (TPAt) minus the total
nominal value of unproductive
roductive assets (TIAt) over the total nominal value of assets (TAt)
in the system.
ystem. The equation then, is
is:

The intent of this variable is to measure the stability of the banking system since the year
2000. The higher the proportion, the mor
more stable the system because the percentage of
assets rendering income for the banks is higher.

Figure 1: Z

36

NPLt: Credit risk
isk and the stability of the credit market

The second dependent variable in the original model measures the credit risk for
each bank. Pérez Hernández (2009) defines NPL as “risky loans
loans.” More specifically,
specifically she
defines it as the nominal value of short
short-term
term loans plus the nominal value of past-due
past
loans over the nominal value of total loans. In this analysis, this variable is misleading,
misleading as
loans in Ecuador are mostly sshort-term (that “roll-over) and their value has increased.
The value of past-due
due loans has decreased significantly and thus it is clear that the
country’s credit risk has decreased
decreased, which is why I define NPLt as the nominal amount of
loans on default over the total amount of loans in the system. The lower the proportion,
the higher the quality of the loans held by the banks
banks, since the risk of default is lower.
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Figure 2: NPLt
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Independent Variables

There are seven independent variables in the models introduced in this analysis.
Below I present a brief description of each variable, including how it is defined, what it
attempts to explain, as well as a graphical representation of the observations throughout
the period of analysis.
GDPt-1

The first independent variable is GDPt-1. I used the natural log of the real value in
order to make the coefficient more manageable. I also adjusted the data from quarterly to
monthly in order to have the same number of observations as in all other variables.
Furthermore, I lagged the data one month since, theoretically, the stability of the financial
system is as likely to be affected by current and lagged GDP. If only current values were
used, there is the statistical risk of mutual causation between the dependent and the
independent variables. To avoid this problem I lagged GDP; in this way, GDP of the
month prior to the one being analyzed cannot depend on the stability of the financial
system and thus, the causation can only be in one direction.
Lt: Liquidity

This variable is defined as the available funds at time t divided by the short-term
deposits held by the bank. I did not change this variable, but I took into account the
information for the whole system.
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Figure 3: Liquidity
Ht: Degree of concentration of the financial system

In the original model, this index variable measured the market power of each bank
in the credit market of the Dominican Republic to capture the degree of concentration of
the financial system. In this analysis I did not consider the data of individual banks, and
thus I had to adapt the variable. To do so, I considered the aggregated values of the assets
of the four largest banks in the system. Ideally, the variable would be defined as the
income sum from the four largest banks over the total income of the system, but that
information was not available for the period of analysis. Thus, I defined the variable as
the sum of the total assets of the country’s four largest banks over the total value of assets
of the system. The formula is:

!



∑ #$%%!
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where TABBt stands for the Total Assets of Big Banks and TAt stands for total assets in
the system. My objective was to capture the degree of concentration in the Ecuadorean
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financial system by measuring the percentage of assets that are held by those institutions
that have the most assets in their balance sheets.
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Figure 4: Assets of the 4 largest banks
It should be noted that a first look at the variable Ht could lead to a
misinterpretation. In order
er to understand the significance of the sign of the coefficient,
coefficient it
is necessary to understand the regulations of the financial system. Itt is hard to understand
the impact of the degree of concentration at a more regional level because a bank may
have a strong presence in one region but not in another. Thus, it is important to keep the
level of analysis at which the study is being conducted clearly
ly defined in order to
understand the variable’s on the financial system’s stability.. In other words, conclusions
about the effect of the concentration of the financial system at a national level should not
be extrapolated from thiss study, especially because of the aggregate and macroeconomic
macro
nature of the data being considered.
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CIRt: The balance sheet of the banks

Since my data are defined at the macro-level, it is hard to have a variable that
measures the market share of each bank in terms of loans. Instead, the variable measures
the structure and stability of the banks’ balance sheets. CIRt is the total nominal value of
assets in the system (TAt) over the total nominal value of the liabilities in the system
(TLt). The formula for this ratio is:
&'(! 

#$!
#)!

This variable seeks to capture two issues: a) to assess the level of soundness in the
banking practice of the financial system in Ecuador. One of the basic accounting
principles is that total assets are equal to total liabilities plus patrimony and, as such, the
ratio should always be higher than one. Thus, a ratio in which total assets are higher than
total liabilities shows promise of growth and expansion of the financial system. And b)
too high a ratio shows that the system might be gravitating towards more risk of both
systemic collapse due to a run on the banks and illiquidity to pay what it owes the people.
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Figure 5: assets over liabilities
A value much greater than 1 could mean irresponsible behavior because banks
could be lending excessively and carelessly. Likewise, a ratio far below 1 could show that
banks are unwilling to lend money because they think that there is too much risk in the
system, or that individuals are unwilling to take out loans due to high interest rates. It is
important to understand the limitations of this variable’s explanatory power to not infer
misleading conclusions.
CAt: Productive assets

Just like the previous variable, CAt measures the quality of the balance sheet of
the banks, but it does so in terms of the quality of the assets banks hold at a particular
point in time. I define this variable in the same way it is defined in the original model,
that is, as the proportion of assets that produce income and revenue for the financial
institutions. Thus, the equation reads as follows:
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where TPAt stands for the total nominal value of productive assets at time t and TAt as
usual stands for the total nominal value of assets at time t in the system. Clearly, the
higher this proportion, the better banks should be performing and thus, the system should
be more stable.
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Figure 6: proportion of productive assets

CVCt: Proportion of past-due loans

Banks risk clients failing to repay their loans.. In the original model, this variable
is defined as the proportion of loans that are late on their payments. Due to complications
with the data and differences in the countries studied, I redefine the variable CVCt as the
percentage of loans that have become past-due. This variable represents the percentage of
loans that the bank considers as losses and does not expect to collect. This measure is
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important for both dependent variables, because it captures the risk level in the economy.
If the level of past-due loans goes up, there is a problem with the country’s economy, and
vice versa. It is clear that the lower the value measured in this variable, the better it will
be for the stability of the system.
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Figure 7: Proportion of Expired Loans
EOt: Financial efficiency

EOt portrays the level of financial efficiency in the system at a certain time t. The
technical definition of the variable is the gross financial margin at time t (GFMt) over the
total nominal value of income for the banks at time t (It). The equation is the following:
+,! 

-./!
'!

This variable is critical to this analysis because financial efficiency is one of the
most important aspects of financial stability. The more efficient the banks, the more
stable the system in general -- or at least that is what should be expected.
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Figure 8: Efficiency of the financial system
The Data

Data for both models was taken from the “Superintendencia de Bancos’” monthly
reports 1 . This institution is in charge of regulation and oversight of all financial
institutions in the country and, as such, it has monthly data from January 2000 onwards.
For GDP 2 and oil prices 3 , I consulted the database “Indexmundi,” a database with
information for most countries of the world. The models use monthly observations
beginning in January 2000, and ending in September 2011.

1 See:
http://www.sbs.gob.ec/practg/sbs_index?vp_art_id=29&vp_tip=2&vp_buscr=41#series2
2 See: http://www.indexmundi.com/ecuador/
3 See: http://www.indexmundi.com/commodities/?commodity=crude-oil&months=180
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Chapter 4 Estimations and Results

In this chapter, I present the econometric models and show the results for the most
important regressions. In addition, I describe and analyze the regressions and present
conclusions.
Zt Model Estimation

In order to maintain consistency with the original model and to use it as a starting
point, the first step I took in this analysis was to run the regression as presented in Pérez
Hernández (2009) for the Dominican Republic. However, I assumed that the relationship
between the independent and the dependent variables would be a linear one and thus
removed the variable Ht2 from the regressions.

Table 1: Original model Zt regression 1
. reg zt zt1 ht cat lt cirt cvct eot gdpt1
Source

SS

df

MS

Model
Residual

3.27843333
.067417208

8
131

.409804166
.000514635

Total

3.34585054

139

.024070867

zt

Coef.

zt1
ht
cat
lt
cirt
cvct
eot
gdpt1
_cons

.5191067
-.1525108
.1543321
-.1396157
-.1768602
-.9735594
.0195691
.0168357
.1929163

Std. Err.
.0645606
.1232948
.0755662
.0611733
.0642818
.1887569
.029019
.0109327
.2618762

t
8.04
-1.24
2.04
-2.28
-2.75
-5.16
0.67
1.54
0.74

Number of obs
F( 8,
131)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE

P>|t|
0.000
0.218
0.043
0.024
0.007
0.000
0.501
0.126
0.463

=
=
=
=
=
=

140
796.30
0.0000
0.9799
0.9786
.02269

[95% Conf. Interval]
.3913905
-.3964172
.0048441
-.260631
-.304025
-1.346966
-.0378373
-.0047918
-.3251374

.6468229
.0913957
.30382
-.0186003
-.0496955
-.6001533
.0769755
.0384632
.7109699
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Table 1 shows a large level of serial autocorrelation, as seen by the Durbin-Watson
Statistic (DWS). The values for this statistic range from 0 to 4. The closer the statistic is
to the extremes, the greater the serial correlation; the closer the statistic is to the value 2,
the lower the serial autocorrelation. In the regression shown in table 1, the value of the
DWS is 1.21666. An effective way to correct for this problem is to use the CochraneOrcutt method of estimations. Table 2 shows the results of the regression ran with the
Cochrane-Orcutt method:

Table 2: Zt Cochrane-Orcutt Estimation
Cochrane-Orcutt AR(1) regression -- iterated estimates
Source

SS

df

MS

Model
Residual

.288923311
.058033582

7
131

.041274759
.000443004

Total

.346956893

138

.00251418

zt

Coef.

ht
cat
lt
cirt
cvct
eot
gdpt1
_cons

.3682368
.1263793
-.2756882
-.1486158
-1.55263
.1552458
.0120469
.2982144

rho

.7124137

Std. Err.
.1874551
.0555818
.0861026
.0603256
.1834089
.0555309
.0075237
.2404435

t
1.96
2.27
-3.20
-2.46
-8.47
2.80
1.60
1.24

Number of obs
F(
7,
131)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE

P>|t|
0.052
0.025
0.002
0.015
0.000
0.006
0.112
0.217

=
=
=
=
=
=

139
93.17
0.0000
0.8327
0.8238
.02105

[95% Conf. Interval]
-.002594
.0164252
-.4460197
-.2679542
-1.915456
.0453925
-.0028367
-.1774403

.7390677
.2363335
-.1053566
-.0292774
-1.189803
.2650992
.0269305
.773869

Durbin-Watson statistic (original)
1.216666
Durbin-Watson statistic (transformed) 2.073841

The DWS has gone from 1.216666 to 2.074, which indicates that the serial
autocorrelation has been addressed. Also, all the coefficients in the second table have
statistically significant p-values, and thus could be included in the model. The adjusted
R2 is also fairly high (.8238) and accurate since it is no longer a biased estimator. It is
best to limit a time-series regression to five variables in order to show true correlation
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and a model unburdened by noise. Thus, I decided to drop GDP from the equation
because it is the variable with the worse p-value and is not significant at the 5 percent
confidence level. Good practice suggests that if we are to drop a variable, it should be the
one with the least statistical significance. Table 3 shows the regression without GDP.

Table 3: Zt Cochrane-Orcutt estimation 2
Cochrane-Orcutt AR(1) regression -- iterated estimates
Source

SS

df

MS

Model
Residual

.281517896
.059167526

6
132

.046919649
.000448239

Total

.340685422

138

.002468735

zt

Coef.

ht
cat
lt
cirt
cvct
eot
_cons

.3493496
.1401988
-.2738557
-.1505553
-1.574482
.1509952
.5597815

rho

.7159548

Std. Err.
.1882635
.0551116
.0866317
.0605973
.1840192
.0559998
.1761423

t
1.86
2.54
-3.16
-2.48
-8.56
2.70
3.18

Number of obs
F(
6,
132)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE

P>|t|
0.066
0.012
0.002
0.014
0.000
0.008
0.002

=
=
=
=
=
=

139
104.68
0.0000
0.8263
0.8184
.02117

[95% Conf. Interval]
-.0230542
.0311825
-.4452219
-.2704227
-1.93849
.0402221
.2113546

.7217533
.249215
-.1024896
-.0306878
-1.210474
.2617682
.9082084

Durbin-Watson statistic (original)
1.107798
Durbin-Watson statistic (transformed) 2.081437

The adjusted R2 dropped to .8184 and all coefficients, but one, are highly
significant. In the case of Ht the p-value falls from .052 to .066. The DWS remains at a
value close to 2 (2.081437) and the coefficients retain their signs. Since Ht is not
significant at the 5 percent level of confidence, I ran another regression without including
this variable. Table 4 shows these results:
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Table 4: Zt Cochrane-Orcutt estimation 3
Cochrane-Orcutt AR(1) regression -- iterated estimates
Source

SS

df

MS

Model
Residual

.348310357
.060544101

5
133

.069662071
.000455219

Total

.408854458

138

.002962713

zt

Coef.

cat
lt
cirt
cvct
eot
_cons

.1249052
-.2907548
-.142987
-1.782032
.1081567
.8162375

rho

.6796957

Std. Err.
.0550461
.0848748
.061276
.1442447
.0479521
.1050761

t
2.27
-3.43
-2.33
-12.35
2.26
7.77

Number of obs
F( 5,
133)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE

P>|t|
0.025
0.001
0.021
0.000
0.026
0.000

=
=
=
=
=
=

139
153.03
0.0000
0.8519
0.8464
.02134

[95% Conf. Interval]
.0160261
-.4586339
-.2641886
-2.067343
.0133093
.6084011

.2337843
-.1228757
-.0217853
-1.496722
.203004
1.024074

Durbin-Watson statistic (original)
1.026226
Durbin-Watson statistic (transformed) 2.063334

Clearly, the results in the table above are statistically better than those in Table 3.
The value of the DWS is still around the value that is supposed to be, but the R2 value of
the regression went up to .8464 meaning that the elimination of both variables increased
the explanatory power of the other independent variables. Note that the elimination of the
variables did not cause any change in signs of coefficients. Thus, with this final model
84.64 percent of the variation in the financial stability index (Zt) can be explained by the
variation in the ratio of productive assets (CAt) liquidity (Lt), change in the balance sheets
of the banks (CIRt), proportion of past-due loans (CVCt), and financial efficiency (EOt).

The final mathematical form for this model then reads as follows:
1. 0!  12  1 &$! 3 1 )! 3 1 &'(! 3 1 &4&!  1 +,!  5!
For which the regression is the following:
2. 6!  .81624 . 1249>?! 3 .291@! 3 .143>BC! 3 1.7820>F>!  .108GH!
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Zt: Interpretation of results

Zt is positively correlated with the ratio of productive assets (CAt) and financial
efficiency (EOt) but negatively correlated with the variables liquidity (Lt), proportion of
past-due loans (CVCt), and the balance sheets of banks (CIRt,). This means that if either
CAt or EOt increase (which they have), ceteris paribus, the value for Zt will increase. On
the other hand, if Lt, CIRt, or CVCt (the first two have decreased but the latter has
increased) decrease, ceteris paribus the value of Zt will increase.
The coefficient associated with the ratio of productive assets (CAt) is positive. As
this ratio increases, so does banking stability in Ecuador. These results are fairly selfexplanatory -- the larger the proportion of assets rendering income for the banks, the
more stable individual banks will be, thus increasing the aggregate stability of the system.
The same can be said for financial efficiency (EOt) -- an increase in the efficiency of the
banks leads to less unresolved potential, thus more stability. Even though the sign is
inversed, the explanation for the variable of the proportion of past-due loans (CVCt) is as
straightforward as that of efficiency -- the higher the proportion the more unstable the
system, and vice versa.
One of the coefficients that might be confusing at first glance is liquidity (Lt). In
this model we see that as liquidity increases, banking stability decreases. This may seem
counter-intuitive as the more liquidity there is the safer the banks are against a run on
them. The problem is that when liquidity gets too high, banks are reluctant to lend money
since bankers lack confidence on the stability of the financial system. Another confusing
variable with a negative sign on its coefficient is the one that represents the balance
sheets of the banks (CIRt). The negative sign suggests that as the ratio of total assets over
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total liabilities increases, the stability of the financial system decreases. The explanation
for this is similar to the reasoning behind that of liquidity, but this time the reluctance is
voiced by the consumer. When assets are too high, banks need more deposits from
individuals (liabilities) in order to keep expanding their business. When the ratio is too
high, it suggests that consumers of the system do not trust the banks with their money or
are spending too much and not saving enough. In both cases the balance between deposits
and loans is broken and the stability of the system is jeopardized.
The coefficients explain by how much the value of Zt varies when the independent
variable changes by one unit. For example, if the variable financial efficiency goes up by
one percent, the value of Zt will go up by .108 percent. Similarly, if CVCt (proportion of
past-due loans) falls by one percent, the index of financial stability will fall by 1.782
percent. The same interpretation is important for all the other variables.
NPLt: Model Estimation

NPL is intended to measure the risk level of the financial system in terms of credits,
i.e. variables that affect the type and quality of assets held by a bank. As noted in chapter
three, for the dependent variable NPLt I have redefined Pérez Hernández’s variable to
show the actual financial risk in terms of the Ecuadorean market of credits. Table 5
presents the original model with its redefined dependent variable.
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Table 5: NPLt Original model
. reg npl nplt1 ht htht cat lt cirt cvct eot gdpt1
Source

SS

df

MS

Model
Residual

2.09671665
.00655833

9
130

.232968517
.000050449

Total

2.10327498

139

.015131475

npl

Coef.

nplt1
ht
htht
cat
lt
cirt
cvct
eot
gdpt1
_cons

.0910318
.7147956
-.633245
-.0555822
.0436363
.1203168
1.561745
.0354884
-.0044784
-.2169882

Std. Err.

Number of obs
F( 9,
130)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE

t

.0320641
.6116855
.5283564
.0230894
.0199582
.0206707
.0735919
.009264
.0033831
.2069135

P>|t|

2.84
1.17
-1.20
-2.41
2.19
5.82
21.22
3.83
-1.32
-1.05

=
140
= 4617.93
= 0.0000
= 0.9969
= 0.9967
=
.0071

[95% Conf. Interval]

0.005
0.245
0.233
0.017
0.031
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.188
0.296

.0275968
-.495351
-1.678535
-.1012618
.0041513
.0794223
1.416152
.0171608
-.0111714
-.6263418

.1544668
1.924942
.412045
-.0099026
.0831213
.1612114
1.707337
.0538161
.0022147
.1923654

Similar to the previous model, the DWS is 1.05, which means that there is a
problem of serial correlation. Table 6 presents the results of the regression ran with the
Cochrane-Orcutt method:
Table 6: NPL Cochrane-Orcutt Estimation 1
Cochrane-Orcutt AR(1) regression -- iterated estimates
Source

SS

df

MS

Model
Residual

.327297707
.004518147

7
131

.046756815
.00003449

Total

.331815854

138

.002404463

npl

Coef.

ht
cat
lt
cirt
cvct
eot
gdpt1
_cons

-.0704707
-.0422649
.0276449
.0610449
1.595359
.012722
-.0004636
.0191534

rho

.6121797

Std. Err.
.04966
.0161577
.0234394
.0172856
.0496953
.013908
.0022067
.0672446

t
-1.42
-2.62
1.18
3.53
32.10
0.91
-0.21
0.28

Number of obs
F(
7,
131)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE

P>|t|
0.158
0.010
0.240
0.001
0.000
0.362
0.834
0.776

=
139
= 1355.68
=
0.0000
=
0.9864
=
0.9857
=
.00587

[95% Conf. Interval]
-.16871
-.0742286
-.0187239
.0268498
1.49705
-.0147914
-.0048289
-.1138724

.0277685
-.0103012
.0740138
.0952401
1.693668
.0402355
.0039018
.1521792

Durbin-Watson statistic (original)
1.053264
Durbin-Watson statistic (transformed) 2.040581

The regression in table 6 is considerably better and more accurate. The DWS went
from 1.05 to 2.04, which is an acceptable value. In this case, though we have a very high
adjusted R2 of .9857, we can see that some of the variables are not statistically
significant, so I dropped GDP for the same reasons as before.
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Table 7: NPLt Cochrane-Orcutt Estimation 2
Cochrane-Orcutt AR(1) regression -- iterated estimates
Source

SS

df

MS

Model
Residual

.323715913
.004519631

6
132

.053952652
.00003424

Total

.328235544

138

.002378518

npl

Coef.

ht
cat
lt
cirt
cvct
eot
_cons

-.0699337
-.0427839
.0274842
.0609528
1.595932
.0128225
.0094531

rho

.6145175

Std. Err.
.049437
.0158638
.0233686
.0172059
.0494248
.0138841
.0472662

Number of obs
F( 6,
132)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE

t

P>|t|

-1.41
-2.70
1.18
3.54
32.29
0.92
0.20

0.160
0.008
0.242
0.001
0.000
0.357
0.842

=
139
= 1575.74
= 0.0000
= 0.9862
= 0.9856
= .00585

[95% Conf. Interval]
-.1677249
-.0741641
-.0187411
.0269179
1.498164
-.0146415
-.0840441

.0278575
-.0114036
.0737096
.0949876
1.693699
.0402866
.1029503

Durbin-Watson statistic (original)
0.986458
Durbin-Watson statistic (transformed) 2.042468

Table 7 still shows improved results. Again, the results are good but there are
variables that can be removed, in particular financial efficiency and liquidity. Table 8
shows the results without financial efficiency, and Table 9 without liquidity.
Table 8: NPLt Cochrane-Orcutt Estimation 3
Cochrane-Orcutt AR(1) regression -- iterated estimates
Source

SS

df

MS

Model
Residual

.316694522
.004548674

5
133

.063338904
.000034201

Total

.321243196

138

.002327849

npl

Coef.

ht
cat
lt
cirt
cvct
_cons

-.0906076
-.0431624
.0209095
.0594146
1.564773
.0350761

rho

.619127

Std. Err.
.0443244
.0158187
.0223155
.0171332
.0363752
.0387129

t
-2.04
-2.73
0.94
3.47
43.02
0.91

Number of obs
F(
5,
133)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE

P>|t|
0.043
0.007
0.350
0.001
0.000
0.367

=
139
= 1851.98
=
0.0000
=
0.9858
=
0.9853
=
.00585

[95% Conf. Interval]
-.1782795
-.0744512
-.0232297
.0255259
1.492824
-.0414965

-.0029357
-.0118736
.0650486
.0933034
1.636722
.1116487

Durbin-Watson statistic (original)
0.856972
Durbin-Watson statistic (transformed) 2.044701
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Table 9: NPLt Cochrane-Orcutt Estimation 4
Cochrane-Orcutt AR(1) regression -- iterated estimates
Source

SS

df

MS

Model
Residual

.310261059
.004578564

4
134

.077565265
.000034168

Total

.314839623

138

.002281447

npl

Coef.

ht
cat
cirt
cvct
_cons

-.0950442
-.0458022
.0592299
1.559457
.0470173

rho

.6234009

Std. Err.
.0441568
.0155155
.0171101
.036001
.0367407

t
-2.15
-2.95
3.46
43.32
1.28

Number of obs
F( 4,
134)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE

P>|t|
0.033
0.004
0.001
0.000
0.203

=
139
= 2270.09
= 0.0000
= 0.9855
= 0.9850
= .00585

[95% Conf. Interval]
-.1823786
-.0764892
.0253891
1.488253
-.0256494

-.0077097
-.0151152
.0930707
1.630661
.119684

Durbin-Watson statistic (original)
0.857653
Durbin-Watson statistic (transformed) 2.027328

With the aforementioned variables removed, the model appears to be properly
specified, as there does not seem to be any confounding or extra variables in the model.
In the last regression, 98.5 percent of the variation of the credit risk in the banking system
of Ecuador (NPLt) can be explained by the variation of the concentration of the banking
system (Ht), the proportion of productive assets (CAt), the quality of the balance sheet of
banks (CIRt), and the proportion of past-due loans (CVCt). One thing to note about this
model is that there appears to be a large degree of multicolinearity between some of the
independent variables since,even though all the aforementioned variables are significant,
CVCt appears to have an extraordinary influence on the dependent variable.
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Table 10: NPLt Cochrane-Orcutt estimation 5
Cochrane-Orcutt AR(1) regression -- iterated estimates
Source

SS

df

MS

Model
Residual

.24199176
.005360659

1
137

.24199176
.000039129

Total

.247352419

138

.001792409

npl

Coef.

cvct
_cons

1.570058
.0156858

rho

.6720428

Std. Err.
.0199648
.0020073

t
78.64
7.81

Number of obs
F( 1,
137)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE

=
139
= 6184.48
= 0.0000
= 0.9783
= 0.9782
= .00626

P>|t|

[95% Conf. Interval]

0.000
0.000

1.530579
.0117166

1.609537
.0196551

Durbin-Watson statistic (original)
0.610324
Durbin-Watson statistic (transformed) 1.879340

Table 10 shows the regression of NPLt as the dependent variable and only CVCt
as the independent variable. Since CVCt represents the proportion of past-due loans, this
variable is largely correlated with the credit risk of the system. That being said, I am
reluctant to remove all the other variables from the equation because, theoretically, they
are more helpful in understanding the stability of the financial system in terms of credit
risk. Thus, because they are still clearly significant and carry strong theoretical
explanatory power, I have also included them in the final model for NPLt. The final
model for NPLt reads as follows:
1. NPL  β2 3 β H 3 β CA  β CIR   β CVC  ε
For which the estimated regression is:
2. npl  .047 3. 095h 3 .0458ca  .0592cir  1.56cvc
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NPLt: Interpretation of results

NPLt is negatively correlated with both Ht and CAt but is positively correlated
with CIRt and CVCt. These distinct correlations indicate that, as the degree of
concentration of the financial system or the level of productive assets increases (both of
which have increased), ceteris paribus, the level of credit risk drops. On the other hand, if
the percentage of past-due loans or the ratio between total assets and total liabilities
increases, so does the credit risk of the financial system. The coefficient in front of the
banking system concentration variable suggests that as the concentration of the banking
system increases by one percent, the credit risk decreases by .095 percent. This
relationship suggests that the more concentrated the banks (meaning that banks are bigger
and stronger), the greater the stability of the financial system.
Conclusions

The above analysis shows that the level of stability in the banking system of
Ecuador is associated with, liquidity, the proportion of past-due loans, the balance sheets
of the banks, financial efficiency, concentration of the banking system, and the ratio of
productive assets. The more telling of the two models is Zt for it shows the system-wide
risk of financial collapse. The NPL model does not really tell us much that was not
known before, but it is included here as a reminder of what determines the credit risk of
the system.
In this chapter I did not include dollarization directly as an independent variable.
Two reasons dictated my decision. First, the available data did not enable me to measure
the empirical effects of the dollarization on the economy of Ecuador. Second, and
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possibly more important, dollarization is not just one more independent variable to
consider. Dollarization, as it pertains to this analysis, is the main context variable that has
affected the financial system.
In the following chapter I explain the effects of dollarization on the previously
considered independent variables. I hope that by the end of next chapter, the link between
dollarization and the banking system will be understood. For now, however, it suffices to
say that the banking system of Ecuador has become vastly more stable and that this
stability is significantly correlated with the variables presented in this analysis.
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Chapter 5: Effect of the Dollarization on the Banking System

What is the relationship between the stability and strength of the financial system
in Ecuador and dollarization in 2000? This question is the one I intend to tackle in this
chapter. But how do I answer this question? Due to the collapse of the currency in 2000,
there is little information (economic, banking, and financial) before the dollarization was
introduced. Thus, it is impossible to conduct an econometric analysis on how
dollarization affected the dependent variables. In their paper “Dollarization: Analytical
Issues,” Roberto Chang and Andrés Velasco relied on theory to evaluate the dollarization
process. They claim that because there have been very little cases of dollarized countries,
and all of them had been carried out fairly recently (especially when they wrote their
paper), they decided to rely on a theoretical approach to evaluate the effects of the
dollarization process (Chang & Velasco, 2001). Thus, in the absence of data and
following their example, I also use a theoretical approach to explain the link between
dollarization and the stability of the financial system.
The estimations in chapter 4 for the post-dollarization period are relevant because
they show that the financial system has gained stability. It is easier to explain the effects
of dollarization on the independent variables after having identified and estimated a
stability model. Since each independent variable is more narrowly defined, it is possible
to analyze how dollarization would affect each one, rather than the more aggregate and
complex outcome of financial stability. In this regard I follow the contributions to the
literature of Sebastian Edwards, Igal Magendzo, Roberto Chang and Andrés Velasco,
Sofia Castillo, and rest of authors mentioned in chapter 1.
According to the literature, four main positive effects can be identified:
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1. A statistically significant reduction of inflation from hyperinflation in the 1990’s
to one-digit inflation all throughout the 2000’s;
2. Elimination of the Lender of Last Resort (LOLR) as the role of the Central Bank.
With dollarization, the Central Bank’s function is reduced to a regulatory
institution. It does not have the power to rescue and bailout underperforming
banks, thus reducing the moral hazard problem bankers face. This creates better
management in banks and increases financial efficiency;
3. Dollarization builds credibility on the regulatory institutions. With a Central Bank
and the “Superintendencia de bancos” that have the critical and basic role of
regulating the system, it is easier for the institutions to build credibility both
nationally

and

internationally.

Dollarization

also

eliminates

the

time-

inconsistency problem and the Central Bank has to adhere to a consistent
monetary policy, further building credibility and reliability;
4. Dollarization eliminates currency risk. By adopting a larger and more powerful
currency, investors will no longer fear that depreciation will diminish their assets.
Dollarization and its Effect on the Independent Variables

Economists agree that there are intrinsic benefits in dollarization, as it may enable the
creation of financial stability. The literature has focused on dollarization for overall
macroeconomic indicators such as inflation and economic growth, but few studies have
analyzed specific sectors such as banking. Hence, my main contribution to the literature,
is developing a banking model applicable to the post-dollarization era and analyzing how
dollarization affected the independent variables in the model.
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Dollarization has stabilized prices and increased international trade

Perhaps one of the most studied consequences of adopting a foreign currency as a
legal tender is the effect on macroeconomic variables, predominantly GDP. The views on
this subject are divided, and thus I cannot claim that GDP growth is generated directly by
dollarization. What I can argue, however, is that dollar adoption (along with increase in
oil price) has brought about a tremendous level of macroeconomic stability to Ecuador.
Combined with the irrefutable decrease in inflation4, business opportunities have grown
and attracted foreign direct investment. Another positive effect engendered by
dollarization is that, since 2000, the dollar has depreciated in terms of other international
currencies. This means that Ecuadorean exports to other international actors (not the
United States) have become cheaper, which induces greater international trade. In fact,
one of the most debated topics in the country right now is the creation of a free trade
agreement with the European Union that would alleviate the dominance of the United
States on the Ecuadorean market for exports.
Dollarization eliminates currency risk, attracts foreign direct investment and increases
the likelihood of granting loans both to Ecuadorean firms and to the Ecuadorean
government. This reality, however, has not developed in Ecuador yet. The political risk
associated with Rafael Correa’s regime and the “socialism of the 21st Century” he
promotes, has scared away potential investors. Furthermore, the rapid growths of
Colombia, Peru, and Brazil, coupled with the small local economy size have reduced
international interest in Ecuador and dollarization has not played a significant factor at
Adoption of the dollar automatically stops hyperinflation and re-introduces stability to
prices. With price stability the economy can go back to conducting business with stable
expectations
4
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the macroeconomic level. It is fair to say, however, that in recent years, Ecuador has
created a different set of international allies signing free trade agreements with Iran and
accepting a large amount of loans from the Chinese government.
The adoption of the US dollar means that prices in the United States affect domestic
consumption in Ecuador in absence of an exchange rate regime. Ecuadorean tradables
cannot compete with manufactures of the United States and agricultural products, so the
market has been inundated with these products.
Dollarization Increases banking intermediation

Due to currency risk elimination and drastic inflation reduction, banks hold less cash
and are able to meet their lending and investment operations. Before dollarization, banks
used to make loans at really high interest rates, or make dollar loans in order to overcome
the risk of the sucre depreciating or risk inflation. Also, banks would make
predominantly short-term loans in order to avoid default.
In reality, we see a decrease in the amount of liquidity in the market from early
2000 (in April, the liquidity of the financial system was at 40 percent) to June 2011 when
liquidity dropped to 29 percent of assets having passed through a low of 20 percent some
years back. Short-term loans, on the other hand, have increased and still dominate the
market for loans in the country.
Dollarization leads to greater concentration

In order for banks to be able to survive dollarization and for dollarization to be
effective, the banking system has to write-off underperforming loans. In other words,
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banks have to be strong and large to absorb losses. Banks that are not robust enough to
deal with the crises fail and go bankrupt. This was clearly the case in Ecuador when
about 70 percent of financial institutions collapsed by the end of the crisis that led to
dollarization. Banks that survived-the four largest banks in particular- are strong enough
to withstand the harshest of environments.
One of the main effects of dollarization on the banking system has been to diminish,
if not totally remove, the capacity of any one institution within the country -- including
the government -- to act as LOLR. Whether this is good or bad is often disputed, but in
the case of Ecuador it was probably a good thing. Most economists agree that with the
disappearance of an institution to act as LOLR, the presence of oversight and strong
management becomes critical. Banks know that if they decide to accept very risky
projects and they fail, there is no institution to bail them out and would go under if their
losses are too large.
The sword is a double-edged weapon because a banking crisis can be very costly, and
the last crisis cost Ecuador 22 percent of its GDP. The inability of the Central Bank to
bailout a bank reduces the moral hazard problem of time-inconsistency, thus forcing the
banking system to be more credible and responsible. This condition helps explain the
increasing trend towards the greater concentration of banks throughout the last decade.
Thus, dollarization has meant that only the best banks in the system have survived and
now operate more efficiently.
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Dollarization increases banking productivity and efficiency

The most important dollarization effect is the reduction of moral hazard caused by
the LOLR practice. With the elimination of the LOLR practice, banks have to scrutinize
their assets more rigorously and can no longer lend money expecting that if something
goes wrong, the Central Bank will bail them out to avoid a financial crisis. Furthermore,
banks have to get better managers and plan ahead in order to survive in the new system.
With better management and greater oversight, the proportions of productive bank
assets and of past-due loans have improved. In the past decade, the ratio of productive
assets went from about 60 percent in mid-2000 to just below 90 percent in mid-2011.
Moreover, the ratio of past-due loans went from around 20 percent in the crises years
until the end of 2000 to below five percent in 2011.
Most economists agree that dollarization improves financial efficiency through
the loss of LOLR as it directly engenders a vast increase in financial efficiency.
Furthermore, as mentioned before, the dollarization process in Ecuador triggered the
failure of those banks that were not efficient enough to survive.
It is clear from the data that the financial efficiency of banks in Ecuador has
vastly increased in the last ten years. The measure for financial efficiency has gone up
from between zero and ten percent in the first months of the year 2000 to right above
seventy percent in the later months of 2011. Furthermore, the recent proliferation of
smaller financial institutions shows that a larger percentage of the market has some sort
of access to the banking system through both microfinance and credit agencies that focus
on micro loans as well.
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Dollarization improves the balance sheets of banks

The drastic inflation drop created by dollarization improves the balance sheets of
banks. A decrease in inflation promotes saving rather than immediately spending money.
Depositors are no longer afraid of putting their money in banks and having the value of
their savings drastically diminished the next month. Banks are able to reduce
significantly the passive interest they pay depositors, thus making it less expensive for
them to leverage capital. As a result, banks can lower the active interest rates they charge
to lenders making it easier for them to find clients willing to take out a loan.
Impact of Oil Prices on Banking Stability

There are other variables worth examining. The price of oil has increased
considerably since the mid-2000s and has brought a lot of money into Ecuador that could
be promoting stability in all sectors. Similarly, a seemingly politically stable period since
the election of President Rafael Correa could be considered another important context
variable. Correa is the only president since the election of Sixto Durán Ballén in 1992 to
finish his mandate in office. Due to popular upheaval, previous presidents failed to
complete their constitutional mandates. This was true for Abdalá Bucarám, Jamil
Mahuad, and Lucio Gutiérrez, who were elected and later ousted from office. The first
argument is further explored in this section, but the second one I do not discuss because
arguments are vastly speculative.
It has been suggested, therefore, that the sharp increase in oil prices throughout
the last decade has helped promote growth and financial stability throughout Ecuador, as
seen in the graph below:
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Figure 9 Price of Oil with 2005=100
Though the price of has risen
risen, large swings are evident.. If the financial stability of the
country were solely dependent
ndent on the price of oil, the swings would transfer into the
banking system. Furthermore, the oil factor has been present in the country for the past
forty years and the country
ountry has never experienced the growth in financial stability that
characterizes this past decade. Not even when oil wa
was discovered and the economy grew
rapidly, was there a similar development and deepening of the banking system.
s
If
anything, the economy’s dependence on oil prices has generated more economic
instability than economic stability
stability.
In the estimations presented in chapter 4, GDP was removed from the equation
and the results improved. It was removed because it became evident that the correlation
c
between the banking stability
ability and the growth in the GDP was not strong.
strong However,
because GDP is one of those variables that affect all the economy’s sectors,
sectors a more indepth analysis of its effects is warranted.
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Conclusion

The transitive property in mathematics states that if A is equal to B and B is equal
to C, then A is equal to C. The analysis conducted in this chapter carries the same logic.
If dollarization affects the independent variables, and the independent variables explain
the dependent variables, then it can be said that the dependent variables are affected or
explained by dollarization.
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Conclusions

The purpose of my thesis is to study the factors that affect the stability of the banking
system in Ecuador and to assess the role of dollarization. Taking as the starting point the
two models presented by Luisa Erika Pérez Hernández (2009), I conducted a time-series
econometric analysis to identify the relationships between the banking stability of the
country and the selected independent variables. The two dependent variables were Z and
NPL. Z explains the level of financial stability within the system, and NPL gauges the
credit risk of the banking system. The original independent variables were GDP,
liquidity, financial efficiency, the proportion of productive assets, the percentage of pastdue loans, the ratio between total assets and total liabilities, and the degree of
concentration of the banking sector. The final estimated models are presented below:
1. Z  β2  β CA 3 β L 3 β CIR  3 β CVC  β EO  ε
a. z  .81624 . 1249ca 3 .291l 3 .143cir 3 1.7820cvc  .108eo
2. NPL  β2 3 β H 3 β CA  β CIR   β CVC  ε
a. npl  .047 3. 095h 3 .0458ca  .0592cir  1.56cvc
My study shows that the stability of Ecuador’s banking system is highly
correlated with the independent variables specified above. Furthermore, because of the
improvements in all of the variables shown in chapter 3, it is clear that the financial
system has become vastly more stable.
Chapter 5 contributes a theoretical discussion on the effects of dollarization on the
independent variables. I show that through the four main benefits of dollarization on a
small, open, and developing economy, the values of the independent variables have
improved. The four main effects of dollarization on an economy are: i) the statistically
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significant decrease in inflation, ii) the removal of the figure of the Lender of Last Resort,
iii) the removal of currency risk, and iv) the increased credibility of regulatory
institutions. These positive effects are proven to have a direct connection to the
independent variables, and thus to the dependent variables portraying financial stability.
During the analysis of dollarization and banking stability in Ecuador, I faced
several problems. First, there is no data to conduct an econometric study on dollarization
and the banking system. Hence, my first recommendation to improve and strengthen the
econometric model is to find data for the 1990s and analyze how the banking sector was
doing before the dollarization and how it is doing now.

The problem with this

recommendation is that the data prior to the dollarization cannot be compared to that of
post-dollarization without omitting important factors like inflation.
The second major improvement that would greatly benefit this analysis, but at the
same time make it more complex, would be to use cross-section data for all the banks, or
for a representative sample of banks throughout the period of analysis. This comparison
would provide an accurate and demonstrative picture of the reality of the country. I could
not do this because of my limited understanding of econometrics and the techniques used.
Lastly, it would help to go over the variable specification in order to be able to
link dollarization to each independent variable. Furthermore, if it were possible to
establish the econometric significance of dollarization on each of the dependent variables,
it would demonstrate the effects the dollarizing an economy would have in the well-being
of its banking system and its society.
With the above suggestions in mind, it is important to emphasize the contribution
of my analysis. It represents a first step to understanding the effects of dollarization both
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in the Ecuadorean banking system and on that of any country that either is dollarized or is
thinking of dollarizing. Very few analyses have been conducted on the effects of
dollarization on specific sectors, such as banking. The intrinsic understanding of such
effects allows governments and citizens to make better-informed decisions. There are
trade-offs when adopting a drastic measure for an economy, and it is important to
recognize that what may be good for some sectors may not be good for others. It is
therefore necessary to understand all the policy implications in order to reduce the
likelihood of negative unexpected consequences.
More specific to this analysis, it is clear that dollarization has substantial potential
benefits for the banking sector of an economy. Hence, a deep understanding of the exact
repercussions of dollarization is required. My analysis is case-specific and it focuses on
the economy of Ecuador only, showing that, for this country, dollarization did indeed
help the banking sector. Economists suggest this type of analysis as necessary to discuss
the particular effects of policy implementation. Also, this analysis shows that if nothing
else, dollarization has allowed the development of a banking system that is now more
stable and better prepared to face the challenges that will come in the future.
Some economists, including President Rafael Correa, argue that dollarization of
the Ecuadorean economy was not a good thing; that the loss of sovereignty and monetary
policy were detrimental to the country. Bu at least from the banks’ point of view,
dollarization has been nothing but beneficial to the country. Reversing it would only
increase instability and risk in an economy that already has enough of both.
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